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In an ideal world, international arbitration would be governed by a truly internationalised 
regime, freed from the internal constraints of national laws. International awards would be 
controlled according to international standards, defining, amongst other matters, the limits of 
international public policy and establishing the thresholds for the existence and validity of the 
arbitration agreement. Autonomous sources of transnational law would govern arbitral 
procedure, the powers of arbitrators and the effectiveness of international arbitral awards. In 
addition, transnational bodies, similar to national courts, would be entitled to control and 
execute an arbitral award in any national legal jurisdiction. International commerce and 
arbitration would have established their own and autonomous transnational legal order.1 
Even though such an autonomous order has not yet been created, international arbitration has 
gained considerable autonomy from individual national jurisdictions. We follow the view that 
international arbitration case law has developed, by way of custom, general principles 
applicable to international arbitration, which form part of a truly transnational law of 
arbitration.2 One of these principles, relates to the arbitrators’ powers to decide on their own 
competence, the so-called Kompetenz-Kompetenz principle.3 Even though this principle is 
currently widely accepted by the international community and has been adopted by almost 
every modern international arbitration law, the question of Kompetenz-Kompetenz has not 
always been undisputed. 
The underlying historical controversy was the following. If the powers of arbitrators 
necessarily relied, in first instance, on a valid and operative arbitration agreement, which 
submitted the parties’ dispute to arbitration and ousted the jurisdiction of national courts, an 
                                                 
1 For a view on the transnationalisation of international commercial arbitration, see Dalhuisen (2016). 
2 Lima Pinheiro (2005), p. 444. 
3 See Texaco preliminary award: “It is for the Sole Arbitrator to render a decision on his own jurisdiction by 
virtue of a traditional rule followed by international case law and unanimously recognised by the writings of 
legal scholars.” (Texaco Overseas Petroleum Company v. The Government of the Libyan Arab Republic, YCA 
1979, at 177 et seq.). 
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objection to arbitrators’ jurisdiction would ultimately challenge the very premise of their 
decision-making powers. Thus, arbitrators would not be entitled to assess their own 
jurisdiction. In this context, the acceptance of Kompetenz-Kompetenz has proven that 
arbitrators’ powers cannot be exclusively explained with reference to the arbitration 
agreement. 
In turn, a totally different concept is the so-called “negative effect” of the Kompetenz-
Kompetenz principle, which is gaining evermore acceptance in many national legal orders.4 
According to such negative effect doctrine, courts should give arbitrators priority to decide on 
their own jurisdiction. The New York Convention does not provide any guidance on that 
matter. Under its provisions, an arbitration agreement will oust the jurisdiction of national 
courts, unless it is “null and void, inoperative or incapable of being performed”.5 
In fact, a court may have doubts as to whether the arbitration agreement has ousted its own 
jurisdiction when the claimant argues, for example, that the arbitration agreement has not 
been validly agreed (v.g. due to misrepresentation or duress in relation to the arbitration 
agreement), has never come into existence (v.g. due to lack of consent by the parties), is 
formally or materially invalid (is not in writing or violates mandatory provisions), or that the 
disputed issue is not within the scope of the arbitration agreement.6  
In that case, the French courts, which first developed the concept of the negative effect,7 will 
under certain circumstances not examine any jurisdictional objection and decline their 
jurisdiction almost immediately. However, the precise scope and content of this negative 
effect has always been subject to great debate by the international community. For instance, 
the German courts do not recognise the negative effect doctrine and decide any objection to 
jurisdiction at the outset of the dispute, without giving arbitrators the opportunity to have the 
first word on the issue. In turn, England adopted an approach in which the courts will 
generally take the particular circumstances of the case into account in order to decide whether 
                                                 
4 Brekoulakis (2009), p. 250. 
5 Article 2(3). 
6 Varady, Barceló, Kröll & Mehren (2015), p. 125. 
7 See Gaillard & Savage (1999), pp. 395-396. The principle is applied in France as early as 1949. 
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an objection to jurisdiction should be decided by a court or instead be referred to arbitration. 
In turn, US case law will analyse the parties’ presumptive intentions regarding who should 
have primary power to decide jurisdictional objections.  
In sum, the different approaches taken by national courts are an expression of each country’s 
unique policy preference. Since the New York Convention has not defined any mandatory 
rules on this matter, countries are free to adapt their procedural laws according to their own 
views and interests. Some countries want to guarantee that jurisdiction of arbitrators is subject 
to immediate and full judicial review, while others seem to favour preventing arbitration from 
being obstructed by long and costly judicial proceedings at the outset of the dispute.8  
In this context, the purpose of this master thesis will be to perform a critical assessment of the 
different approaches taken by national jurisdictions on the negative effect doctrine and 
analyse the merits of the underlying policy preferences. In the final chapter, we will present 
our own view on the negative effect of the Kompetenz-Kompetenz principle and will suggest 
alternative methods for improving the efficiency of arbitral proceedings. 
2. KOMPETENZ-KOMPETENZ AND THE AUTONOMY OF THE 
ARBITRATION CLAUSE 
2.1 The various meanings of Kompetenz-Kompetenz 
2.1.1 Positive effect of Kompetenz-Kompetenz 
As we already mentioned above, arbitrators have the power to decide on their own 
jurisdiction once a jurisdictional objection is raised during arbitral proceedings, as a 
transnational principle of international arbitration. This power is also commonly referred as 
the “positive effect” of Kompetenz-Kompetenz.9 
The position adopted as the legal fundament basis of this principle is strongly related to the 
more general view adopted regarding the arbitrators’ powers. Legal scholars who take the 
view that arbitrators’ powers are defined by party autonomy and the arbitration agreement 
will probably argue that the basis of Kompetenz-Kompetenz is the presumed intention of the 
                                                 
8 Barceló (2017), p. 2. 
9 It also known as “competénce-compétence” (France) or “competence-competence”. 
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parties to confer arbitrators the power to upon all aspects of their dispute.10 Localists, 
according to which international arbitration would necessarily be based on the lex arbitri, or a 
set of national laws, derive Kompetenz-Kompetenz from the arbitration law of the country 
where the arbitration is held (lex arbitri), or more generally, the laws of all countries liable to 
recognise an award on jurisdiction.11 In our view, this principle is a customary principle of 
transnational law of arbitration consistently held by international arbitration case law and 
promoted by the need to confer stability to arbitral proceedings.12  
Thus, the effectiveness of Kompetenz-Kompetenz would not depend on an express provision 
of the lex arbitri. Even if we imagine the extreme case in which an arbitral award is annulled 
at the seat, because Kompetenz-Kompetenz violates mandatory provisions of the lex arbitri, 
there would be certainly very few countries (if any) ready to refuse recognition and 
enforcement of an international arbitral award on such ground.13 Notwithstanding, it cannot 
be denied that the execution of the arbitral awards’ legal effects is still dependent on the 
attitude taken by the country in which the award is sought enforcement. A recognising 
country with a parochial view towards international arbitration will still be able to refuse 
enforcement of an arbitral award if it finds the latter to be against its domestic public policy 
(see article V(2)(b) of the New York Convention). Since international arbitration is dependent 
on national enforcement mechanisms, which are still able to deny recognition by applying 
purely domestic standards of control, we cannot argue that an autonomous transnational legal 
order exists. The absence of this order does, however, not affect the existence of autonomous 
principles of transnational law (v.g. due process), which are binding on arbitrators even if 
these principles are not adopted by the lex arbitri or other national laws.14 
                                                 
10 Poudret & Besson (2007), p. 386. 
11 Gaillard & Savage (1999). p. 399. 
12 See also Dalhuisen (2016). 
13 Annulment at the country of the seat has no mandatory extraterritorial effect under article 5(1)(e) of the New 
York Convention. 
14 Lima Pinheiro (2005), p. 445. 
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2.1.2 Binding Kompetenz-Kompetenz 
Nonetheless, the original meaning of Kompetenz-Kompetenz was different than the one 
described above. In fact, with the signing of the Westphalia peace treaties (1648) and the rise 
of modern state theory, German scholars referred to Kompetenz-Kompetenz as the 
sovereign’s authority to define its own powers.15 Later, under the premise of the principle of 
the separation of powers, the judiciary was given total independence from the “executive 
power” and courts were granted the power to decide on their own competence with binding 
effect on all other state entities16. If we applied this concept to arbitration, arbitrators would 
have the power, per se, to decide upon a jurisdictional objection with finality, without 
subsequent court review. Kompetenz-Kompetenz would be inherent to the arbitrator’s power 
to decide on the merits of the dispute and would not depend on a prior agreement between the 
parties. It can be argued that Germany granted arbitrators, at least for some years, with 
binding Kompetenz-Kompetenz.17 Currently, to the best of our knowledge, no country grants 
an arbitration tribunal this power. 
2.1.3 Negative Kompetenz-Kompetenz 
Our work will deal in greater detail with the third meaning of Kompetenz-Kompetenz, called 
the negative effect of Kompetenz-Kompetenz. This effect was historically developed in 
France and corresponds to the rule whereby arbitrators must have the first opportunity to hear 
challenges relating to their own jurisdiction.18 According to Gaillard & Savage, the negative 
effect of Kompetenz-Kompetenz rests upon the principle that there are no grounds to suspect 
that arbitrators will not be capable of rendering decisions regarding the applicable jurisdiction 
that are fair and protect the interests of society, as well of those of the parties to arbitration.19  
                                                 
15 Menezes Cordeiro (2015), p. 191. 
16 Section 17 of the Gerichtsverfassungsgesetz (1877), the German Law of Judicial Organization. 
17 BGH 14.05.1952, Az.: II ZR 276/51. 
18 Gaillard & Savage (1999), p. 395. 
19 Gaillard & Savage (1999), p. 399-400. 
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2.2 The different scopes of application 
Differences between the various meanings of Kompetenz-Kompetenz can best be highlighted 
in the three-stage schema of the arbitral proceedings, used by Barceló:20 
 Stage 1: Takes place before a state court. One of the parties to the dispute brings an action 
in national courts and the respondent raises the arbitration agreement as a defence, seeking 
referral to arbitration. Arbitration proceedings may already have commenced. However, 
no award has been rendered yet by arbitrators. The negative effect question arises at this 
stage. Countries enforcing the negative effect of Kompetenz-Kompetenz are likely to let 
arbitrators decide first on their jurisdiction. Other countries will prefer the jurisdictional 
dispute to be resolved by the court at the outset of the judicial proceedings. 
 Stage 2: Takes place before an arbitrator. One of the parties has initiated arbitral 
proceedings and the respondent objects to the arbitration tribunal’s jurisdiction. At this 
stage the positive effect of Kompetenz-Kompetenz comes into play. Most countries 
entitle arbitrators to take a decision on their jurisdiction, which is subject to subsequent 
court review. 
 Stage 3: Takes place before a national court. An arbitral award on jurisdiction has been 
rendered in Stage 2, either by way of a preliminary award or as a final award together with 
the decision on the merits. Stage 3 refers to the proceedings in which one of the parties 
applies for setting aside of the arbitral award or has opposed its enforcement on the 
grounds of lack of jurisdiction. Under the original meaning of binding Kompetenz-
Kompetenz, arbitrators would have the power to decide the jurisdictional dispute with 
finality at stage 2, i.e. without court review at stage 3. 
2.3 Separability of the arbitration agreement 
The analysis of the Kompetenz-Kompetenz principle normally brings up the subject of the 
separability of the arbitration agreement. Just as Kompetenz-Kompetenz, the principle of 
separability has become a customary principle of transnational arbitration law.21 
                                                 
20 Varady, Barceló, Kröll, & Mehren, A. (2015), pp. 124-125. 
21 Dalhuisen (2016), p. 66. 
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Both principles have the purpose of strengthening the arbitral jurisdiction. However, they are 
two distinct concepts with different practical effects.22  
While Kompetenz-Kompetenz assures stability to the arbitration proceedings whenever 
jurisdiction is called into question, the principle of “separability” protects the arbitrators’ 
power to decide upon the merits of the dispute. 
According to the separability principle, the invalidity of the main contract does not 
automatically affect the validity of the arbitration clause. Since the arbitration clause is 
considered a separate agreement from the main contract, an invalid container contract will not 
automatically compromise the jurisdiction of the arbitration tribunal. As a result, arbitrators 
have jurisdiction to render the main contract null and void. In the absence of the separability 
principle, a tribunal would be obliged to deny jurisdiction every time it found the underlying 
contract to be invalid.  
The UNCITRAL Model Law joins both the Kompetenz-Kompetenz principle (positive effect) 
and the separability principle in the same provision. Hence, article 16(1) states that: 
“The arbitral tribunal may rule on its own jurisdiction, including any objections 
with respect to the existence or validity of the arbitration agreement. For that 
purpose, an arbitration clause which forms part of a contract shall be treated as an 
agreement independent of the other terms of the contract. A decision by the 
arbitral tribunal that the contract is null and void shall not entail ipso jure the 
invalidity of the arbitration clause.” 
However, in some cases the arbitration agreement may be affected by the invalidity or 
inexistence of the main agreement. For this reason, some authors prefer to use the concept of 
“severability”, instead of separability or autonomy of the arbitration clause.23 In this regard, 
Barceló advocates for the view that challenges to the existence of the main agreement (as 
opposed to its validity) would, as a rule, implicitly challenge the existence of the arbitration 
                                                 
22 Lew, Kröll & Mistelis, L. A. (2003), p. 334. 
23 See Mayer (1999). 
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agreement.24 In fact, if one of the parties to arbitration alleges it never accepted the 
contractual offer made by the other party, the arbitration clause has not been agreed to, any 
more than any of the other clauses of the main contract.25 
2.4 Policy considerations: efficacy v. legitimacy 
The negative version of Kompetenz-Kompetenz is often described as an important instrument 
to promote the efficacy of arbitral proceedings. It would minimise the opportunities for a 
recalcitrant party to obstruct arbitration. Countries which implement the negative effect 
doctrine normally claim that their approach should be seen as an evidence of their “pro-
arbitration” bias26 and as important element of their “modern” arbitration laws. 
The concern for efficacy has become very common in the international debate surrounding 
negative effect, thereby undermining the theoretical and practical implications of this 
principle. It is often ignored that the negative effect implies a restriction of the powers of 
national courts.27 The negative effect limits the court’s obligation to review the arbitration 
agreement and, therefore, also its capacity to assess its own jurisdiction. Despite the doubt 
whether parties actually agreed to arbitrate, the negative effect sets out a sort of presumption 
of validity of the arbitration agreement in order to avoid dilatory proceedings. Therefore, a 
low threshold is set for an arbitration agreement to produce legal consequences, which may be 
considered disproportional.28 Finally and most importantly, granting arbitrators the first word 
on jurisdiction will force parties, who have not agreed to arbitrate, to participate in arbitral 
proceedings, being unfairly denied their day in court. All these factors lead us to question 
whether the legitimacy of arbitral proceedings can be reconciled with a strong negative effect 
doctrine. 
 
                                                 
24 Barceló (2017), p. 17. 
25 Mayer (1999), p. 263. 
26 See Gaillard (2011). 
27 Brekoulakis (2009), p. 239. 
28 Ibidem. 
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In contrast, positive Kompetenz-Kompetenz is based on sound policy grounds. As Stavros 
Brekoulakis has correctly said, “it cannot be left to the whims of the parties to derail the 
arbitration proceedings and undermine the authority of the tribunal, merely by alleging that 
the arbitration agreement is invalid”.29 In addition, it does not affect the jurisdiction of 
national courts. A regime of concurrent jurisdiction is established where both national courts 
and arbitral tribunals have an autonomous right to examine the validity and existence of the 
arbitration agreement. 
As we will see in our comparative law analysis, the tension between legitimacy and efficacy 
is inherent to all the different approaches taken by countries to regulate the allocation of 
powers between arbitrators and courts. 
3. NEW YORK CONVENTION 
The most prominent international convention on international arbitration is the Convention on 
the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, also known as the New York 
Convention (1958). To date, the New York Convention has been signed by 159 parties and is 
therefore of the utmost importance for almost every discussion concerning international 
arbitration.30 Article 2(3) of the Convention states that a court shall at stage 1, at the request 
of one the parties, refer the parties to arbitration, “unless it finds that the said agreement is 
null and void, inoperative or incapable of being performed”. As we will confirm below, a 
similar phrase is used in many national arbitration laws.  
Generally, an arbitration agreement will be null and void when it has not been validly agreed, 
or is formally or materially invalid (for example, it has not been made in writing or it violates 
other mandatory provisions). The term “inoperative” refers, amongst other matters, to cases 
where a valid arbitration agreement has been entered into by the parties, but which has 
meanwhile lost its effect. For example, it applies when the arbitration agreement has been 
terminated by the parties.31 Lastly, “incapable of being performed” refers to cases where 
arbitration cannot be commenced, due for example to the refusal of an appointed arbitrator to 
                                                 
29 Idem, p. 251. 
30 Information available at: http://www.newyorkconvention.org/countries (last accessed on 27 June). 
31 Lew, Kröll & Mistelis (2003), p. 341-345. 
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act in that capacity.32 The question whether a certain dispute is contemplated by the scope of 
the arbitration agreement is not mentioned in article 2(3).33 In fact, the exact meaning of this 
provision was not discussed during the preparations of the New York Convention.34 However, 
a truly internationalised regime of arbitration would require that the abovementioned terms 
(“void, inoperative or incapable of being performed”) are given an autonomous interpretation, 
with reference to international standards and the exclusion of national idiosyncrasies.35 Only 
such an autonomous interpretation could foster the creation of a truly transnational legal order 
of arbitration and international commerce.36 
In addition, article 2(3) does not mention whether national courts should apply a prima facie 
standard, or, alternatively, perform a full review on the arbitration agreement. Although the 
wording of the provision suggests that a full review was meant by the drafters, the dominant 
position on the matter is that the Convention does not compel national courts to perform a 
mandatory judicial scrutiny of the arbitration agreement at stage 1.37 National courts would 
not be deterred by the New York Convention from referring the parties to arbitration without 
prior review of the arbitration agreement. Even if courts perform such a review, national 
legislators are free to regulate the applicable standard of review, choosing between a prima 
facie or a de novo review. 
4. UNCITRAL MODEL LAW 
The UNCITRAL Model Law has been a great success in modernising and harmonising 
international arbitration laws of countries all over the world.38 More than 100 jurisdictions 
                                                 
32 Ibidem.  
33 Ibidem. 
34 Lew, Kröll & Mistelis (2003), p. 341-345. 
35 Ibidem. 
36 See Dalhuisen (2016). 
37 Born (2009), p. 857-861. 
38 Blackaby & Partasides (2015), p. 61-62. 
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have enacted arbitration laws based on the provisions of the Model Law by either adopting 
the full text, or introducing some changes, such as Germany, England and Portugal.39  
Adopting a provision similar to article 2(3) of the New York Convention, the Model Law 
leaves the question regarding the negative effect open. At stage 1, a court shall refer the 
parties to arbitration “unless it finds that the agreement is null and void, inoperative or 
incapable of being performed” (article 8(1)). Again, just like we mentioned apropos the New 
York Convention, the natural meaning of the words strongly suggests that a full review was 
meant. The drafters’ intention on this matter is confirmed by the Model Law’s legislative 
history. In fact, a proposal was rejected which would have expressly provided for a prima 
facie review.40 According to that proposal, a court would have to refer the parties to 
arbitration, unless it found that the agreement was “manifestly null and void”. As Gary Born 
stated, “the rejection of this language was particularly significant given that it was precisely 
parallel to that in the (then) recently-adopted 1980 French Code of Civil Procedure, which 
provided for only prima facie judicial review”. 41 
As a conclusion, the Model Law does not add anything to what was already provided by the 
New York Convention. However, the Model Law has introduced rules which are important 
for the discussion regarding the allocation of powers between courts and arbitrators. These 
provisions deserve, therefore, our attention. These solutions relate to (i) the rendering and 
challenge of preliminary awards on jurisdiction, (ii) the possibility for arbitral proceedings to 
be commenced or continued while a judicial challenge to arbitrators’ jurisdiction is pending 
and (iii) the introduction of time limits for raising jurisdictional objections. 
4.1.1 Preliminary award on jurisdiction 
Article 16(3) refers that an arbitral tribunal may rule “as a preliminary question that it has 
jurisdiction”. German arbitration law, for example, has gone beyond the text of article 16(3) 
and provides that arbitrators should “in principle” (in der Regel) decide jurisdiction by way of 
a preliminary award. 
                                                 
39 Ibidem. 
40 Barceló (2017) pp. 6-8. 
41 Born (2009), p. 882. 
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It is undisputed that a preliminary award on jurisdiction has many benefits. An arbitration 
tribunal will at an early stage of the proceedings define its jurisdiction and in case of a 
negative decision costs and time may be saved. In turn, a well-reasoned award may in some 
cases clear up the doubts of the party objecting to jurisdiction. Nonetheless, preliminary 
awards will be limited to those cases in which arbitrators are capable of separating jurisdiction 
from the decision on the merits (v.g. if the decision on jurisdiction raises only points of law).  
The Model Law does also provide that any party may challenge a preliminary award in court, 
which decision shall be subject to no appeal. Some authors argue that the right to challenge a 
preliminary award should be seen as an argument for courts to give arbitrators greater priority 
on jurisdictional issues. Apparently following this line of thought, Barceló argues that “the 
drafters have provided for an approach that harmonizes well with a prima facie test at stage 1. 
That is because it provides for a fairness/procedural efficiency counterbalance – in the form of 
early judicial review of a preliminary ruling”.42 Hence, a preliminary challenge would entitle 
a party objecting to the jurisdiction of arbitrators to obtain judicial relief at an early stage of 
the arbitration proceedings. Besides, an award annulled at the seat of arbitration would 
generally not be enforced by any national court under the New York Convention.43 Thus, 
damage caused to a party, who had not agreed to participate in the arbitral proceedings, would 
be more likely kept within reasonable limits. 
In our view, the possibility to challenge a preliminary award cannot per se justify a negative 
approach doctrine. The reason is primarily related to the fact that a preliminary challenge will 
only be possible in those cases where arbitrators may separate their analysis on jurisdiction 
from the one related to the merits of the dispute. Due to this uncertainty, the right to challenge 
a preliminary award will not guarantee parties a right to early judicial review and can 
therefore not be seen as a satisfactory remedy to solve the legitimacy problems posed by the 
negative effect doctrine. 
                                                 
42 Barceló, (2017), p. 7. 
43 Idem, p. 10. 
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4.1.2 Concurrent jurisdictions 
Article 16(3) does also provide that arbitral proceedings may continue while a preliminary 
award is being challenged in court, having courts and arbitrators concurrent jurisdictions. This 
rule is particularly important in fostering arbitration in cases where arbitrators are confident 
about their award on jurisdiction. In these cases, arbitrators will continue the proceedings and 
promote the rendering of a final award. Even if their award on jurisdiction is annulled at the 
seat, they may still consider rendering a final award if they find that a third country will 
recognise and enforce the award.44 Article 16(3) is therefore an important statement regarding 
the autonomy of international arbitration in relation to the law of the seat. 
Similarly, article 8(2) is a very important provision for the debate on the negative effect 
doctrine. According to the latter norm, arbitral proceedings may be commenced or continued 
while court proceedings are pending at stage 1. Thus, arbitral proceedings are not necessarily 
delayed by the mere that legal action has been brought in court. Consequently, it is not correct 
to assert that arbitration proceedings would be delayed in the absence of a strong negative 
effect provision. Even though full court proceedings are likely to rise the costs of litigation, 
costs cannot be used as a valid argument to restrict one’s fundamental right to access to court.  
4.1.3 Time-limits for raising objections 
Lastly, time-limits to challenging an arbitral tribunal’s jurisdiction are an effective method to 
avoid “last resort” challenges, limiting the field of action of a party pursuing dilatory tactics. 
On this matter, article 16(2) provides that a plea at stage 2 that an arbitral tribunal does not 
have jurisdiction shall be raised no later than in the submission of the statement of defence.45 
Similarly, the plea that the arbitral tribunal is exceeding the scope of its authority shall be 
raised as soon as the matter alleged to be beyond the scope of its authority is raised during the 
arbitral proceedings.  
These provisions must be read in light of Article 4 of the Model Law. According to this 
provision, failure to comply with these limits will be deemed as waiver to the right to object. 
                                                 




Thus, most countries will find that a party will be estopped from challenging a final award on 
grounds of jurisdiction if it has not either (i) raised the objection under the defined time limits, 
or (ii) challenged the preliminary award.  
5. NATIONAL LAWS 
The following comparative law analysis will assess how different jurisdictions allocate the 
powers between arbitrators and courts on the matter of jurisdiction. As a preliminary remark, 
it should be told in advance that every country, with the exception of Germany, has to a 
certain degree implemented some version of the negative effect doctrine.46 Nonetheless, 
national provisions and case-law diverge on many aspects, such as (i) the degree of priority 
given to arbitrators, (ii) the timing of the judicial review, (iii) the standard of the judicial 
review, or (iv) the role of party autonomy. 
Some countries will perform a full review on the arbitration agreement (Germany), while 
others will only conduct a limited prima facie review, or refuse to perform any review at all 
(Portugal and France). According to a third approach, courts will take into account the parties’ 
presumptive or expressed intentions regarding who should decide the jurisdictional objection 
(USA). Lastly, courts may ponder several criteria before deciding who should have the first 
word on jurisdiction (England). 
5.1 Germany 
As already explained in chapter 2, the concept of binding Kompetenz-Kompetenz was 
developed in Germany. Under its strongest version, arbitrators would have the power, per se, 
to decide a jurisdictional objection with finality, i.e. without a comprehensive court review.  
Interestingly, for the most part, scholars and jurisprudence have denied arbitrators even the 
power to decide about their competence at stage 2, i.e. the positive effect of Kompetenz-
Kompetenz. In the 19th century, Prussian courts have consistently held that courts had the 
exclusive power to decide on the jurisdiction of the arbitration tribunal.47 The same stance 
                                                 
46 Brekoulakis (2009), p. 245-246. 
47 Menezes Cordeiro (2015), p. 194. 
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was adopted throughout Germany’s imperial period (1871-1918).48 Thus, parties could derail 
arbitration proceedings by simply raising an objection to arbitrators’ jurisdiction.49 
However, at a time where international commerce significantly grew, parties had no 
significant alternatives to arbitration in order to resolve their disputes. So, in the 1930s, the 
idea gained support that parties could enter into a separate agreement which conferred 
arbitrators binding Kompetenz-Kompetenz, a power traditionally vested in the courts.50 In 
particular, the courts have held that once an arbitration clause conferred the power upon 
arbitrators to decide “any dispute” related to a defined legal relationship, it should be 
interpreted that arbitrators would also have the power to decide about their own competence 
(Zuständigkeit) with finality, in the same way as regarding the merits of the case. This 
interpretation would in fact be very akin to an inherent binding Kompetenz-Kompetenz. 
However, it did not take long until courts and scholars agreed that arbitrators’ Kompetenz-
Kompetenz could not be limitless.51 Arbitrators should only have Kompetenz-Kompetenz if 
the parties had expressly conferred that power upon them in the arbitration clause, or by a 
separate “Kompetenz-Kompetenz” clause”.52 This approach was generally confirmed by later 
decisions of the BGH53 and adopted in Germany until it adapted its arbitration regime to the 
provisions of the Model Law (1997)54. As from this moment on, German courts performed 
always a full review to control the jurisdiction of arbitrators. The arbitrators’ decision on 
jurisdiction was not final anymore. At the present day, Kompetenz-Kompetenz clauses are 
deemed void. It is considered not to be within the disposition of the parties to limit the judicial 
                                                 
48 Ahrendt (1996), p. 13. 
49 Menezes Cordeiro, (2015), p. 194. 
50 Ahrendt (1996), p. 21. 
51 Menezes Cordeiro, (2015), p. 195. 
52 Ahrendt (1996), p.19-20. 
53 See Brehm (2005). 
54 Schiedsverfahrenneuregelungsgesetz, 22 December 1997. 
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review of arbitrators’ jurisdiction. In this regard, party autonomy would disrespect German 
public order.55 
Currently, Germany has procedural rules in place which allow parties to seek a full judgment 
on the jurisdiction of arbitrators, at every stage of the arbitral proceedings. According to 
German authors, the rationale is to assure parties legal certainty.56 
5.1.1  Rejection of the negative effect doctrine 
Section 1032(1) of the German ZPO (Zivilprozessordnung) provides that a court faced with 
an objection to the arbitral tribunal’s jurisdiction shall “reject the action as inadmissible, 
unless it finds that the arbitration agreement is null and void, inoperative or incapable of being 
performed”.57  
German courts reject the negative effect doctrine. They perform a full review on arbitrators’ 
jurisdiction and render a judgment (Urteil) at stage 1, without giving any priority to 
arbitrators.58 Consequently, if a court finds that arbitrators have good jurisdiction, the action 
is immediately rejected as “inadmissible” (unzulässig). Therefore, a stay of proceedings, such 
as is envisaged in the Model Law, will not occur. This rule does also apply when arbitration 
proceedings have already been commenced. Thus, a party may go to court and bring a legal 
                                                 
55 Ahrendt (1996), p. 25. 
56 See Huber & Bach (2015b). It is striking that the BGH’s obvious quest for legal certainty of the arbitral 
proceedings has in some cases defeated its own purpose of assuring the clarity and foreseeability of the parties’ 
rights and duties in arbitration. For example, the BGH considered that a court judgment denying the arbitral 
tribunal’s preliminary award, under section 1040(3), will not turn ipso iure void a final award already rendered 
by arbitrators. According to the BGH, the legal certainty of the ZPO’s challenge system requires an award (on 
the merits) only to be set aside under a proceeding under section 1059 and not ipso iure as a result of an 
interlocutory challenge to the arbitral tribunal’s preliminary award. It seems that legal certainty would be better 
served if the arbitral award would be annulled at the seat regardless whether that judgment was delivered at stage 
1, by way of an interlocutory challenge to a preliminary award, or in a set aside proceeding. 
57 Translation available in Huber & Bach (2015b). In turn, section 1040(1) provides for positive Kompetenz-
Kompetenz. An arbitral tribunal may rule on its own jurisdiction and “in this connection on the existence and or 
validity of the arbitration agreement”. 
58 Huber & Bach (2015b), p. 117. 
 21/50 
action on the merits of the dispute, at any time of the arbitral proceedings. If the defendant 
raises the arbitration agreement as a defence, the court will review the arbitration agreement 
de novo.59 
The ZPO also establishes that a party may file a special application (Antrag) with the purpose 
to determine whether or not arbitration is admissible.60 This provision is not based on the 
Model and corresponds to a similar rule which existed in German arbitration law before the 
1998 reform. Reasons related to procedural economy and to the possibility for a party to 
obtain a prior declaration regarding the admissibility of arbitration have been put forward to 
keep this rule after the reform.61 However, parties may file such application only prior to the 
constitution of the arbitral tribunal. Some authors argue this limit could be seen as an element 
of negative effect.62 However, the provision must be put in the context of the other procedural 
rights available to the parties. An action on the merits will be available at any time. The 
negative effect is, for this reason, very limited.  
The common critic made to German law is that it gives plenty of opportunities for a party to 
delay and obstruct the efficacy of arbitration proceedings. However, as we mentioned before, 
such argument is rather weak considering that section 1032(3) of the ZPO grants arbitrators 
concurrent jurisdiction, allowing them to continue arbitral proceedings while judicial review 
is pending. Commentators also argue that early legal certainty will not be achieved, since 
judgments are normally subject to appeals. Thus, it may take several years until a judgment is 
rendered with res judicata effect.63 However, the same will happen with any other court 
review on jurisdiction, both under a set aside or recognition and enforcement proceeding. The 
only difference is that court proceedings at stage 1 would start sooner and therefore probably 
deliver a binding judgment earlier in time. In addition, it must be noted that normally a party 
objecting jurisdiction will bring a court action in the country where the defendant has its 
                                                 
59 Born (2009), p. 909. 
60 See Section 1032(2). 
61 See Huber & Bach (2015b). 
62 Brekoulakis (2009), p. 245-246. 
63 Ahrendt.(1996), pp. 6-8. 
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assets, which will probably also be the country in which recognition and enforcement of the 
award would be eventually sought. A final judgment with res judicata effect in that country 
can be more determinant for the outcome of the award than control at the seat, which has no 
mandatory extraterritorial effect under article 5(1)(e) of the New York Convention.  
In sum, Germany has a very guarantee-based system which emphasises the need to preserve 
the legitimacy of arbitral proceedings. German public order requires that parties are able to 
prompt exercise of their constitutional right to a “lawful judge”. In addition, it is advocated 
that any restriction to court review regarding arbitrators’ competence must be seen as a 
violation of the principle of rule of law.64 
5.2 France 
5.2.1 Strong negative effect  
France is considered to be a country with a “pro-arbitration” attitude, as it is the home country 
to the concept of the negative Kompetenz-Kompetenz, or “compétence-compétence”. It is one 
of the few examples, along with Portugal, that have a clear rule on the matter. 65  
Article 1448 of the French CCP (Code of Civil Procedure) provides the following: 
“(1) Where a dispute covered by an arbitration agreement is filed before a State 
court, the latter shall decline jurisdiction unless (i) the dispute has not yet been 
submitted to the arbitral tribunal and (ii) the arbitration agreement is manifestly 
void or manifestly inapplicable. 
(2) A court may not decline jurisdiction on its own motion.  
(3) Any stipulation contrary to the present article shall be deemed not written.”66 
                                                 
64 Ahrendt (1996), p. 25. 
65 Article 1465 establishes the positive effect of Kompetenz-Kompetenz: “The arbitral tribunal has exclusive 
jurisdiction to rule on objections to its jurisdictional power.”. 
66 Translation available in Bensaude (2015). 
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Arbitration law in France is not based on the Model Law and has a dualist approach, i.e. the 
law distinguishes between domestic and international arbitration.67 Article 1448, for instance, 
was originally applicable only to purely domestic arbitrations. However, the French Supreme 
Court (Cour de Cassation) extended its application to international arbitration in various 
landmark cases, such as in Jules Verne.68 In 2011, France adopted a new law on arbitration 
and expressly provided that unless parties agreed otherwise, paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article 
1448 applied to international arbitration.69 As we will discuss below, no reference is made to 
paragraph 3.  
French law adopts a two-fold standard to address the negative effect of Kompetenz-
Kompetenz. The degree of priority given to an arbitral decision over a dispute covered by an 
arbitration agreement is dependent on whether the dispute has already been submitted to an 
arbitration tribunal. The strongest version of Kompetenz-Kompetenz takes place when the 
arbitration tribunal has already been constituted70. The inherent logic is that a claim that goes 
to court before arbitration is less likely to be in bad faith.71 In this case, the French courts will, 
without any prior review, decline jurisdiction and refer parties to arbitration. If, however, an 
arbitration tribunal has not been previously constituted, the French state courts perform a 
limited prima facie review in order to assess whether the arbitration agreement is 
“manifestly” void or inapplicable.  
French case law performs a very narrow interpretation, deeming an arbitration agreement 
“manifestly void” only under rare circumstances. According to the judgment in Lopez-Alberdi 
an arbitration agreement is manifestly void when there is not any possibility that the validity 
of the arbitration agreement can be upheld.72 In turn, an arbitration agreement would be 
                                                 
67 See Gaillard (2011). 
68 Cour de cassation, Copropriété maritime Jules Verne et autres v Société ABS American bureau of shipping, 07 
June 2006. 
69 Article 1506. 
70 Under article 1456 of the French Code of Civil Procedure, a dispute is considered to have been submitted to an 
arbitral tribunal once all members of the tribunal have accepted the mission entrusted upon them. 
71 Barceló (2003), p. 1127. 
72 Cour de Cassation, Lopez-Alberdi, 9 October 2001. 
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“manifestly inapplicable” when it would be manifest that it did not apply to the dispute. In 
sum, a court will decline jurisdiction if there is any remote possibility that a valid arbitration 
agreement has been entered into between the parties and that the latter applies to the dispute at 
hands.73 As Stavros Brekoulakis has mentioned, “it would be enough for a clause to mention 
the word “arbitration” for national courts to refrain from examining whether this reference to 
arbitration is void or has any meaning at all”. 
Some authors argue that a strong negative effect at stage 1 is well counterbalanced by a de 
novo review at both set aside74 and recognition and enforcement proceedings.75 However, the 
fact that a party will have full review at stage 3 does not suffice to dismiss the legitimacy 
concerns we have mentioned earlier. A party who has not agreed to arbitrate may still have to 
participate in full arbitration proceedings. Furthermore, Dennis Bensaude explains that French 
courts will only in very rare circumstances deem an arbitration agreement void at stage 3.76 
Since French law does not have formal requirements, courts will examine whether there was a 
“common intent of the parties”.77 A low threshold will suffice. In fact, common intent will be 
found where a party accepts by silence the incorporation (v.g. by an confirmation telex or 
invoice) in the contract of general conditions that contain an arbitral clause.78  
The main policy behind the French approach is to promote the efficacy of the arbitration 
proceeding by disallowing any comprehensive court review concerning the existence, scope 
and validity of the arbitration agreement at stage 1. Again, we do not deny the importance of 
this policy goal. But efficacy should not deem irrelevant the right of a party, who has not 
agreed to arbitrate, the right to go to court. It is disproportional and illegitimate to force such 
party to participate in full arbitration proceedings, when it not clear whether a valid arbitration 
                                                 
73 Bensaude (2015), p. 1133-1188. 
74 Article 1520(1) provides that an action to set aside may be available on the ground that the arbitral tribunal has 
wrongly retained or denied jurisdiction. 
75 Barceló (2017), p. 9. 
76 Bensaude (2015), p. 1133-1188. 
77 Ibidem. 
78 Ibidem. See Cour de Cassation, Bomar Oil, 9 November 1993, and Cour d’Appel Paris, Comptoir 
Commercial Blidéen, 13 September 2007. 
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agreement exists. Besides, if arbitrators wrongly retain jurisdiction, the party will still have to 
apply for set aside of the arbitral award, or refuse its enforcement months or years later.79  
Lastly, in our view, French law should grant courts discretion to under certain circumstances 
perform a full review on existence, validity and scope issues (v.g. when issues could be 
decided solely based on the evidence presented in the written statements). In fact, clear-cut 
rules on how courts should decide at stage 1 will not always foster efficiency. Consider the 
case in which an arbitral tribunal would not yet have been constituted and the court would 
have enough evidence to deliver a judgment at the outset of the dispute. 
5.2.2 Delocalisation 
Finally, it should be mentioned that French law has in many respects adopted a delocalised 
view of international arbitration.80 “Delocalisation” means that arbitration should not be 
subject to control at the seat and be immune to national idiosyncrasies 81 The supervision 
function should be exclusively exercised by courts of the country in which recognition and 
enforcement of the award is sought, as the place where the award’s practical and legal effects 
are enforced (v.g. seizure of assets). Even though it is unrealistic to expect that, at least in a 
near future, countries will abolish their domestic set aside provisions, jurisdictions are 
increasingly allowing parties to previously waive their rights to set aside proceedings (v.g. 
France, Belgium, Sweden or Switzerland).82 
In this context, greater party autonomy is often related to adopting an international concept of 
public order. In fact, France applies an international standard when it exercises public policy 
control at a set aside or recognition and enforcement proceeding. An international concept of 
public policy is narrower than a domestic one. Thus, a breach of domestic public policy may 
                                                 
79 Gaillard & Savage (1999), p. 410. 
80 Like the Cour de Cassation has put it, an international arbitral award “does not belong to any state legal 
system”. Cour de Cassation, Société PT Putrabali Adyamulia v Société Rena Holding et Société Moguntia Est 
Epices, 29 June 2007. 
81 Dalhuisen (2016), pp. 413-415. 
82 Poudret & Besson (2007), p. 385. 
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amount to compliance with international public policy,83 which may permit greater party 
autonomy to the parties of international arbitration. 
In fact, French arbitration law has expressly provided for greater party autonomy after the 
2011 reform. According to the new law, article 1448(3) is not applicable to international 
arbitration (“Any stipulation contrary to the present article shall be deemed not written”). 
This emphasis on party autonomy clearly suggests that parties can confer the power upon 
arbitrators to decide on jurisdiction with finality.  
5.2.3 Waiver to set aside 
In this context, article 1522 of the French Code of Civil Procedure allows parties to waive 
their right to set aside an award. However, this waiver is subject to a caveat. Paragraph 2 of 
article 1522 provides that whenever the parties waive their right to file a set aside action under 
paragraph 1, the parties may still oppose the enforcement of the award in France under the 
same grounds set forth for a set aside application. Normally, an international award rendered 
in France can only be challenged through a set aside action. However, if parties waived that 
right, French courts will still be able to review a challenge to the arbitrators jurisdiction in the 
enforcement proceeding.84 In contrast, if parties seek enforcement in another country, French 
courts will not have performed any review on arbitrators’ jurisdiction at stage 3.  
The French provision is an innovative solution, which may avoid duplication of judicial 
proceedings at stage 3 and promote the efficacy of arbitration. However, it does not cope well 
with the negative effect doctrine. One of the policy arguments given to justify arbitrators’ 
precedence on jurisdiction at stage 1, is that court control could be made by the country of the 
seat at a later stage, both in preliminary challenge or in a set aside proceeding. However, if 
parties have waived their right to set aside, then a party will only be able to have jurisdiction 
fully reviewed by a court at the recognition and enforcement proceedings. In this case, our 
legitimacy concerns become even stronger.  
                                                 




In Portugal, international commercial arbitration is governed by the Voluntary Arbitration 
Law (LAV or Lei da Arbitragem Voluntária), enacted by Law no. 63/2011, 14 December. It 
is a monist law according to which domestic arbitration law provisions shall also apply 
mutatis mutandis to international arbitration.85  
This Law is based on the provisions of the Model Law, but has introduced many changes to 
its original text, such as to the rules governing the negative effect of Kompetenz-
Kompetenz.86 In fact, the LAV was in many ways inspired by the French Arbitration Law, 
even though Portuguese procedural law tradition is heavily influenced by German legal 
thought. This mix of influences is patent in some solutions envisaged by the LAV.87 
In regard to the negative effect doctrine, article 5(1) provides that a state court shall, if the 
respondent so requests, dismiss the case, unless it finds that the arbitration agreement “is 
manifestly null and void, is or became inoperative or is incapable of being performed”.88  
Portuguese courts have consistently performed a very narrow interpretation. Courts consider 
that an arbitration agreement should be considered manifestly null, inoperative or incapable of 
being performed (i) when it is not necessary to analyse any additional evidence to arrive at 
this conclusion, when only assessed with regard to its external requisites, such as form and 
arbitrability;89 or (ii) in the exceptional circumstances in which the defects are so evident that 
they almost do not need to be demonstrated by the party.90 Hence, the courts will dismiss the 
                                                 
85 Article 49. However, Chapter 10 (articles 55 to 58) is only applicable to international arbitration. 
86 Moura Vicente (2014), p. 1 
87 Ibidem.  
88 Translation available at: http://www.arbitragem.pt. The positive effect of the Kompetenz-Kompetenz principle 
is anchored in article 18(1) which provides that the arbitral tribunal may rule on its own jurisdiction, even if for 
that purpose it is necessary to assess the existence, the validity, the effectiveness and the applicability of the 
arbitration agreement. 
89 Supremo Tribunal de Justiça, 21 June de 2016.  
90 Supremo Tribunal de Justiça, 7 July 2016. 
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case when there is any “plausibility” (plausibilidade) that parties have entered into a valid 
arbitration agreement.91  
Contrarily to France, Portuguese courts will always perform a prima facie review of the 
arbitration agreement at stage 1, independently of whether the arbitration tribunal has already 
been constituted or not. At stage 3, courts will perform a de novo review. 
Just like in France, at stage 3, an agreement will be deemed void under rare circumstances. 
Article 51 provides a favor validitatis rule. Thus, an international arbitration agreement will 
be considered valid if it complies with the requirements set out either by (i) the law chosen by 
the parties to govern the arbitration agreement, (ii) by the law applicable to the subject-matter 
of the dispute or (iii) by Portuguese law.92 This solution is influenced by the French 
transnational approach to international arbitration. The purpose is to detach the validity of the 
arbitration agreement from any parochial national law provision which may deem the 
agreement invalid and, therefore, render the tribunal incompetent. 
In turn, Article 5(4) provides that issues of invalidity, inoperativeness or unenforceability of 
an arbitration agreement cannot be discussed autonomously in a declaratory action at stage 1, 
nor in an interim measure procedure aimed to prevent the constitution or operation of an 
arbitral tribunal.93 The purpose of such provision is to prevent proceedings which solely 
address whether arbitration proceedings are permissible. Portuguese law therefore excludes 
parties any recourse to court proceedings before arbitrators have decided on jurisdiction, 
based on the premise that it is more important to deter dilatory behaviour and abusive use of 
judicial proceedings at stage 1.  
Another interesting aspect of Portuguese arbitration law relates to the concept of international 
public policy. This is one of the matters in which the contradictory influences of the French 
and German legal doctrine are very well illustrated. As we mentioned before, at stage 3, 
France will adopt an international public policy standard. In turn, Germany reviews an award 
with reference to a domestic public policy concept (öffentliche Ordnung).  
                                                 
91 Supremo Tribunal de Justiça, 9 July 2015. 
92Article 51. 
93 Esteves de Oliveira (Coord.) (2014), p. 105. 
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Even though the LAV is inspired by French arbitration law, Portuguese legal tradition has 
always sown great deference to German public policy doctrine.94 Thus, Portugal met this 
approach halfway and adopted a standard which refers to the “international public policy of 
the Portuguese State”.95 This concept was described by the Portuguese Supreme Court 
(Supremo Tribunal de Justiça) as referring to the “fundamental structural principles of 
Portugal’s presence in the concert of nations”.96 This standard is considered to be closer to 
one of domestic nature than a truly international public policy standard.97 The LAV does not 
allow parties to shape the negative effect regime at stage 1, nor to waive their right to apply 
for a set aside proceeding. This view is in line with its rather domestic concept on 
international public order.98  
Given the similarity between the French and Portuguese regime, most of our previous 
commentaries to the former do also apply to the latter. 
5.4 USA 
5.4.1 Party autonomy and the presumptive intention of the parties 
Sections 3 and 4 of Chapter 1 provide that a court shall, if one of the parties so requests, stay 
the trial of the action, “upon being satisfied that the issue involved in such suit or proceeding 
is referable to arbitration under such an agreement” (section 3) and “upon being satisfied that 
the making of the agreement for arbitration or the failure to comply therewith is not in issue”. 
The US Kompetenz-Kompetenz regime has been primarily developed by case-law.99 The 
guiding principle behind recent US court decisions has been the notion that arbitration is a 
                                                 
94 See Menezes Cordeiro (2015), p. 443, for a view against international public policy. 
95 Articles 46(3)(b)(ii), 56(1)(b)(ii), and 54. 
96 Esteves de Oliveira (Coord.) (2014), p. 651. Supremo Tribunal de Justiça, 9 October 2003. 
97 Menezes Cordeiro (2015), p. 454. 
98 Article 46(5). 
99 Born (2009), p. 911. 
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matter of contract. Thus, the allocation of powers regarding the decision on jurisdictional 
objections is by and large a matter of interpreting the parties’ intentions.100 
Notwithstanding, the predominant view over many years was that jurisdictional disputes were 
a matter to be decided by courts and that previous judicial relief should always be available to 
a party objecting to the arbitral tribunal’s jurisdiction.101 The AT&T case102 (1986) is often 
cited as one example which illustrates the latter approach.103 However, AT&T should, in our 
view, be seen as the turning point in American case-law. Thus, it laid down the foundation for 
the later First Options judgment. 
In AT&T, both the first instance court and the court of appeals held that it was for the 
arbitrator to decide whether the parties have intended, under the applicable collective 
bargaining agreement, to arbitrate the dispute. The Supreme Court, however, vacated the 
Seventh Circuit’s decision and remanded the case. Nonetheless, Justice White wrote in his 
opinion that: 
“The principles necessary to decide this case are not new.(…)  
The first principle (…) is that "arbitration is a matter of contract and a party 
cannot be required to submit to arbitration any dispute which he has not agreed so 
to submit. (…)  
The second rule, which follows inexorably from the first, is that the question of 
arbitrability - whether a collective-bargaining agreement creates a duty for the 
parties to arbitrate the particular grievance - is undeniably an issue for judicial 
determination. Unless the parties clearly and unmistakably provide otherwise, 
the question of whether the parties agreed to arbitrate is to be decided by the 
court, not the arbitrator.” (emphasis added) 
                                                 
100 Barceló (2017), p. 14. 
101 Born (2009), pp. 912-914.  
102 AT&T Technologies v. Communications Workers, 1986, April 7 
103 Born (2009), pp. 912-914. 
 31/50 
Although the Supreme Court decided that the question of jurisdiction was for the court to 
decide, it also admitted that parties could agree otherwise, provided that their intention was 
“clear and unmistakable”. 
This reasoning paved the way for the US Supreme Court judgment in the First Options 
case104 (1995). Here the court dealt with the question of which standard to apply in reviewing 
the arbitrators’ decision on “arbitrability” (arbitrability in the US sense corresponds to 
jurisdiction and not to whether a certain dispute is capable of being decided by arbitration, as 
in Europe). Nonetheless, in answering that question, the court mentioned in obiter dicta which 
approach a court should follow at stage 1: 
“the answer to the “who" question (i. e., the standard-of-review question) is fairly 
simple. Just as the arbitrability of the merits of a dispute depends upon whether 
the parties agreed to arbitrate that dispute (…) so the question "who” has the 
primary power to decide “arbitrability" turns upon what the parties agreed about 
that matter”. 
Hence, if parties had agreed to submit jurisdiction (“arbitrability”) to arbitration, then the 
courts’ standard of review at stage 3 should be the same limited review as the one used to 
review the merits: namely a “manifest disregard” standard, as provided in section 10 of the 
Federal Arbitration Act.  
However, courts should not assume that the parties agreed to arbitrate jurisdiction unless there 
was “clear and unmistakable” evidence that they did so. 
If, on the other hand, parties did not submit jurisdiction to arbitration, then a court should 
decide the matter de novo. First Options presumes that, in the absence of any clear and 
unmistakable agreement in this regard, parties would have intended jurisdiction to be decided 
by a court. The argument was that parties “might not focus upon that question or upon the 
significance” of having arbitrators decide their own jurisdiction.105 In fact, First Options 
                                                 
104 First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 1995. 
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linked the US negative effect regime to the parties’ presumptive, or expressed, intentions on 
this matter. 
Later US Supreme Court decisions introduced some caveats to the First Options rules. In 
Howsam106 (2002), the Supreme Court addressed the question whether the application and 
interpretation of a contractual limitation period was to be primarily decided by a court or by 
arbitrators.107 The controversy regarded a provision contained in the National Association of 
Securities Dealers (NASD) Code which provided that no dispute should be eligible for 
submission “where six years had elapsed from the occurrence or event giving rise to the 
dispute”. On this matter, the court held that questions of procedural arbitrability are 
presumptively for the arbitrator to decide, while issues of substantive arbitrability are 
presumptively to be decided by courts. In this regard, procedural arbitrability would include 
“allegations of waiver, delay, or a like defense to arbitrability”, while substantive arbitrability 
would relate to issues like the validity, existence and scope of the arbitration agreement. In 
general, “an arbitrator shall decide whether a condition precedent to arbitrability has been 
fulfilled”, such as time limits, notice, laches, estoppel and others. The court reasoned that 
parties are likely to expect an arbitrator to decide such “gateway matters” and that the NASD 
arbitrators are “comparatively more expert about the meaning of their own rule” and are 
therefore in a better position to interpret and apply the latter. 
Lastly, it must be highlighted that US courts have an important discretionary power to stay 
litigation and refer the matter to arbitration, even when a jurisdiction issue would be 
presumptively for courts to decide, under the case law established by First Options and 
Howsam. The exercise of such discretionary power will normally take several factors into 
account, such as the efficiency of proceedings, the prejudice to either party, the credibility of 
the challenge, the expertise of arbitrators, the applicable law or the nature of the dispute 
(whether only legal or also factual issues involved).108 If, however, judicial proceedings are 
stayed at stage 1, the courts will perform a de novo review at stage 3.109 
                                                 
106 Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 37 U.S. 79, 2002. 
107 Born (2009), p. 920. 
108 Idem, p. 949. 
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All in all, under the US regime, validity, existence and scope issues will be presumptively for 
a court to decide, while conditions precedent to arbitration, such as time limits, notice, laches 
and estoppel for arbitrators. Note that the US have implemented a some sort of binding 
Kompetenz-Kompetenz. Once a jurisdictional issue is primarily to be decided by arbitrators, 
courts will use a “manifest disregard” standard (the same used to review the merits) to review 
an arbitral award in set aside or recognition and enforcement proceedings.  
One the one hand, it seems reasonable to assume that parties would have intended certain 
conditions precedent, such as time limits and waiver to be decided by arbitrators. The 
existence and the validity of the arbitration agreement are not in dispute. So, it could be 
argued that the legitimacy of the arbitral proceedings is not threatened. However, parties will 
not have the right to have jurisdiction reviewed at set aside and recognition and enforcement 
proceedings. On this matter, it is unwarranted to assume on the basis of their presumptive 
intentions, that parties have waived to their rights to set aside or refuse enforcement of the 
award. In our view, such presumption goes too far. A waiver to rights of appeal should be 
necessarily rely on an express agreement between the parties.  
Notwithstanding the above, US courts have a discretionary power to stay litigation. In our 
view, such discretionary power should be used in order to refer, under exceptional 
circumstances, scope issues to arbitrators. Our view on this matter will be further explained 
below. 
Finally, the US Supreme Court has delivered a troubling judgment in BG Group,110 which 
will excessively enhance US binding Kompetenz-Kompetenz. In BG Group, the Supreme 
Court presumed that the parties intended the arbitral tribunal to decide about existence, 
validity and scope issues (“substantive arbitrability”) based on the fact that they adopted 
UNCITRAL Arbitration rules, which contained a provision establishing the positive effect 
(not the negative) of Kompetenz-Kompetenz.111 The consequence of the BG Group judgment 
                                                                                                                                                        
109 Idem, p. 953. 
110 BG Group PLC. v. Republic of Argentina, 2014. 
111 Article 23(1) of the 2010 rules provided: “The arbitral tribunal shall have the power to rule on its own 
jurisdiction, including any objections with respect to the existence or validity of the arbitration agreement.” 
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will be that courts will not have any say on both substantive and procedural arbitrability 
whenever parties adopted institutional arbitration rules with a positive effect provision. In this 
regard, it must be noted that the positive effect of Kompetenz-Kompetenz does not grant 
arbitrators the power to decide jurisdiction with finality, nor does it relate to the question 
about who should have the first word on jurisdiction.112 Rather, it only entitles arbitrators to 
decide on jurisdiction at stage 2. The BG Group judgement is therefore surprising. 
5.4.2 The unenforceability problem of party autonomy  
As we referred above, parties may change the presumptive rules of First Options and 
Howsam by mutual agreement (“jurisdiction agreement”). However there is a logical problem 
inherent to such power. As correctly questioned by Barceló: “If one party claims that the 
putative arbitration agreement either does not exist or is invalid, how could that very 
arbitration agreement determine ex ante who should decide those claims?”. 
The point is that the jurisdiction agreement will be itself disputed when the validity or the 
existence of the arbitration agreement is called into question. Probably, such agreement would 
only be enforceable if the jurisdiction agreement was agreed in a separate and autonomous 
clause of the container agreement and only if the validity (and not the existence) of the 
arbitration agreement was being disputed. 
5.5 England 
5.5.1 Discretionary approach 
England plays an important role in the international arbitration scene. International contracts 
are predominantly drafted in the English language and English law is often used to mediate 
international commerce, as London one of the world’s main seats of international 
arbitration.113 
England modernised its arbitration laws with the enactment of the 1996 Arbitration Act, 
which clarified previous statutory provisions and codified principles developed by case law. 
Nevertheless, common law still plays an important role in interpreting and applying the 
                                                 
112 Rau (2005), p. 465. 
113 See Sheppard (2015). 
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provisions of the Arbitration Act.114 England has not adopted the text of the Model Law, but 
in many ways it has followed its structure and taken many of its provisions into account.115 
The new arbitration law does not provide a clear-cut rule on the negative effect doctrine.116 
Section 9(4) of the Arbitration Act resembles article II(3) of the New York Convention. Thus, 
at stage 1, a party may apply to the court to stay the judicial proceedings, which shall grant a 
stay unless satisfied that the arbitration agreement is “null and void, inoperative, or incapable 
of being performed”.  
Consequently, section 9(4) leaves the question open as to whether the courts should give any 
priority to arbitrators on disputes regarding jurisdiction. However, English case law has not 
developed a clear-cut answer to this question, since the courts preferred to apply a 
discretionary approach to the negative effect principle.117  
In this regard, Birse Construction is one of the landmark cases118. Birse Construction, a 
private construction company, brought a legal action in court against St David Ltd. in order to 
recover payment for the construction of luxury apartments in Cardiff Bay. The defendant 
argued that the parties entered into an arbitration agreement and requested the court to stay the 
proceedings under section 9. The claimant contended that there should be no stay of the 
proceedings unless the court was satisfied that there was clearly an arbitration agreement.  
Birse Construction refers to four possible approaches a court may adopt under section 9119: 
(1) To determine (with full review) on the evidence before it that: 
a)  an agreement exists in which case a stay must be granted; or that 
                                                 
114 Sheppard, (2015), p. 977. 
115 Blackaby & Partasides (2015), p. 61. 
116 Section 30 enshrines the positive effect of Kompetenz-Kompetenz, referring that, unless otherwise agreed by 
the parties, the arbitral tribunal may rule on its own substantive jurisdiction, namely as to (i) whether there is a 
valid arbitration agreement, (ii) whether the tribunal is properly constituted, and (iii) what matters have been 
submitted to arbitration in accordance with the arbitration agreement. Any ruling made by the arbitral tribunal on 
that matters is subject to subsequent judicial review. 
117 Brekoulakis (2009), p. 247. 
118 Birse Construction Ltd. V. St. David Ltd, 2000. 
119 Approaches were summarised in the case Fiona Trust & Holding Corporation and Others v Privalov, 2007. 
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b) no arbitration agreement exists and dismiss the application to stay; 
(2) If the written evidence is not sufficient: 
a) to stay the proceedings and let arbitrators determine their own jurisdiction; or 
b) to not decide the issue and refer the issue as to whether an arbitration agreement 
exists to trial. 
In this context, Birse Construction established criteria which should apply when the evidence 
before a court did not suffice to take a decision on jurisdiction. These criteria should therefore 
guide courts in deciding between option (2)(a) or (2)(b). They were as follows:120 
(i) issues regarding the existence of an arbitration agreement should generally be for 
a court to decide (especially before arbitration has commenced), unless, for 
example, it is “virtually certain” that there is an arbitration agreement; 
(ii) scope issues are most appropriately dealt with by the arbitral tribunal; and 
(iii) a court should consider the likelihood that an award on jurisdiction will be 
challenged in court because it will not be in interest of the parties to have to return 
to the court to get a definitive answer to a question. Unnecessary delay and 
expenses should be avoided. 
A different view on this matter has been presented in the Albon case.121 In this case, the High 
Court of Justice had to decide whether the objection that the claimant’s signature on the 
arbitration clause was forged should be decided by the courts or be determined by the 
arbitrators. Justice Lightman, who delivered the judgment of the Court, established two 
thresholds as conditions precedent to grant a stay of court proceedings under section 9. Thus a 
court should be satisfied that: 
(i) an arbitration agreement has been concluded; and 
(ii) the issue in the proceedings is a matter which is to be referred to arbitration under 
the arbitration agreement. 
                                                 
120 These guidelines were approved on appeal by several court decisions, such as in Al Naimi v. Islamic Press 
Agency, 2001. 
121 Nigel Peter Albon v. Naza Motor Trading, 2007. 
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If this threshold is not met based on the written evidence before the court, the issue has to go 
trial for further presentation of evidence. However, the court “can stay the proceedings so that 
the arbitrators can decide the issue, but only by exercising its inherent jurisdiction and not 
by exercising any jurisdiction under Section 9. (…) Section 9(4) assumes that an arbitration 
agreement has been concluded and it provides for the situation whether that concluded 
agreement is or may be in law “null and void, inoperative or incapable of being performed.”. 
(emphasis added) 
According to Albon, section 9(4) does not allow the stay of proceedings when the existence of 
the arbitration tribunal is being disputed. Therefore, proceedings could only be stayed when a 
court confirmed that an arbitration agreement had been entered into by the parties. The first 
argument put forward for this conclusion was “that the Rule of Law in general and subject 
only to limited exceptions requires that a party should not be barred from access to the court 
for the resolution of disputes unless the grounds for such bar are established. A bar on the 
ground of the alleged conclusion of an arbitration agreement (in general and subject only to 
limited exceptions) is not established unless and until the court has ruled on the issue whether 
it has been concluded.”  
The second argument relates to the fact “the compelling factors requiring respect for the terms 
agreed regarding arbitration do not come into play with their full force and effect”, unless the 
arbitration agreement has been concluded.  
However, in Albon, the Court argues that a court would be allowed to stay proceedings when 
the existence or scope of the arbitration agreement is being disputed, by exercising its 
discretionary and “inherent jurisdiction”. According to the High Court, such inherent 
jurisdiction should be exercised only in very exceptional cases and take several factors into 
account. These factors are very similar to the ones mentioned in Birse Construction: 
(i) A court should take into account whether the arbitration proceedings have been 
commenced prior to the court proceedings; and whether the decision of the 
arbitrators would be subject to judicial review. 
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(ii) Regarding issues as to the existence of an arbitration agreement, the court should 
only grant a stay if, for example, “it is virtually certain that the arbitration 
agreement was concluded”.  
(iii) When the scope of the arbitration agreement is in dispute, the court could stay the 
proceeding if the scope was found to be “closely bound with the issues in the 
arbitration.”  
As a matter of fact, Albon and Birse Construction have very similar practical outcomes. If 
courts do not have evidence that an arbitration agreement exists, the matter will in principle 
be decided by courts, unless special circumstances suggest otherwise (v.g. that is virtually 
certain that an arbitration agreement was concluded). The differences reside on a rather 
theoretical level. According to Birse Construction, Section 9(4) allows a court, under certain 
circumstances, to stay the proceedings regarding the existence of the arbitration agreement, 
while Albon argues that a stay judicial proceedings in those cases would only be possible by 
the the court’s exercise of its inherent jurisdiction.  
The only somehow contradictory outcome relates to the approach given to scope issues. 
While in Birse Construction, a scope question would arguably be decided by an arbitrator in 
most cases, in Albon scope issues are not covered by section 9 and can only be referred to 
arbitration in the exceptional cases in which the courts exercise their inherent jurisdiction to 
stay the proceedings. 
5.5.2 Criteria for allocating competences 
Under the foregoing case law, English courts will under normal circumstances decide whether 
an arbitration agreement exists. On this matter, Albon shared our concerns regarding the 
legitimacy of the arbitral proceedings. When it is not clear whether an arbitration agreement 
has come to into existence, there is no legal support to oust the jurisdiction of courts. Albon 
refers that barring a party access from court without an established ground for such bar would 
violate the principle of the “Rule of Law”.  
However, English courts admit that under exceptional circumstances a court may stay 
proceedings even when existence issues are at stake. In those cases, the court should take into 
account whether arbitration proceedings have already commenced and if it is “virtually 
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certain” that an arbitration agreement has been entered into between the parties. In addition, a 
court should consider the likelihood that an award on jurisdiction will be challenged in order 
to avoid unnecessary delay and expenses.  
In our view, these criteria cannot justify a stay of the proceedings on the matter of the 
existence of the arbitration agreement. It must be noted that these criteria are essentially 
speculative.  
The premise of the first criterion (whether arbitration proceedings have already commenced) 
is that an objection to the existence of the arbitration agreement is less likely to be legitimate 
if arbitration proceedings have already commenced. However, a party objecting to jurisdiction 
may have refused to participate in the arbitral proceedings. In addition, the mere fact that a 
party appoints an arbitrator and exercises its right of defence does not mean it has agreed to 
the arbitrators’ jurisdiction.  
In addition, it is not clear in which cases it may be considered to be “virtually certain” that an 
arbitration agreement exists. Anyway, a party should not be barred from court based on any 
standard of probability.  
A court should consider the likelihood that an award on jurisdiction will be challenged in 
order to avoid unnecessary delay and expenses. As we mentioned earlier, the possibility to 
challenge a preliminary award on jurisdiction should not be used as an argument to confer 
arbitrators greater priority at stage 1, since arbitrators will only be able to render a preliminary 
award when the issue of jurisdiction is not related with questions of fact and law concerning 
the merits of the dispute. Lastly, court proceedings will not necessarily delay arbitration, 
which may continue while legal action is pending in court. 
Finally, case law have not addressed the hypothesis in which only the validity of the 
arbitration agreement is called into question. However, commentators argue that courts have 
been recently giving precedence to arbitrators to examine issues related to the validity of the 
arbitration agreement.122 
                                                 
122 Brekoulakis (2009), p. 248. 
 40/50 
5.5.3 Scope issues  
The objection that the disputed issue is not within the scope of the arbitration agreement is 
one of the most common grounds invoked to object to arbitrators’ jurisdiction.123 Albon and 
Birse Construction disagree on who should have the first word on scope issues. While Birse 
Construction considers that scope issues are most appropriately dealt with by the arbitral 
tribunal, Albon seems to prefer that scope is dealt with by courts.  
Under US case law, scope is considered to be a “substantive” issue of jurisdiction and would 
be therefore for initial judicial determination. However, there are reasons which suggest the 
opposite view. If we take the criterion of the presumptive intention of the parties, used in First 
Options and Howsam, it may be argued that parties would generally expect arbitrators to 
assess the precise scope and reach of their arbitration agreement.124 A decision regarding the 
scope of an arbitration agreement is deeply connected with the interpretation of the parties’ 
agreement, which can be seen as part of the tribunal’s “conceded mandate” and function.125 
Furthermore, arbitrators can be “comparatively more expert about the meaning” and scope of 
arbitration clauses.  
In addition, giving arbitrators the first word over scope issues does not seem to rise any 
legitimacy concerns. The dispute over scope starts from a completely different starting point, 
when compared to the case where the existence or validity of the arbitration agreement is 
contested.126 Parties have validly agreed to arbitrate their disputes. The dispute is limited to 
the precise reach of the terms agreed between the parties. Therefore, we understand that 
giving arbitrators priority over scope issue does not put into question the parties’ fundamental 
right of access to courts. 
Moreover, scope issues are not directly mentioned in the “null and void, inoperative or 
incapable of being performed” exception, found in the Model Law, the New York Convention 
and in most national arbitration laws. In contrast, the Model Law and the New York 
                                                 
123 Born (2009), p. 931. 
124 Idem, p. 932. 
125 Idem, p. 893. 
126 Idem, pp. 892-893. 
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Convention provide that an award will be set aside (only Model Law) or refused its 
enforcement (both Model Law and New York Convention) when “the award deals with a 
dispute not contemplated by or falling within the terms of the submission to arbitration, or it 
contains decisions on matters beyond the scope of the submission to arbitration”.127 These 
distinctive elements can support the argument that scope issues would be primarily for 
arbitrators.128 
Notwithstanding the above, a court should under certain circumstances have the discretionary 
power to perform a full judicial determination of scope issues, instead of referring the matter 
to arbitration. A court would be advised to exercise such power if, for example, the arbitration 
tribunal had not yet been constituted and if it appeared highly likely or it was manifest that the 
dispute did not fall within the arbitration agreement (v.g. if the arbitration agreement had a 
narrow scope). In those cases it would probably be more cost-effective for a court to make an 
early judicial determination on the matter. As Gary Born has pointed out, “arbitral 
proceedings can take months to constitute a tribunal, can last several years before a final 
award and can cost very substantial amounts of money and other resources.129  
6. CONCLUSIONS 
6.1 Proposal for a restrictive approach on the negative effect doctrine 
6.1.1 Full judicial review on validity and existence issues  
The idea that courts should grant arbitrators priority, or even exclusivity, on objections 
regarding the validity or existence of an arbitration agreement is gaining increasing support in 
the international arbitration community. It is claimed to be an evidence of a country’s “pro-
arbitration” bias.130 
 
                                                 
127 Article 34(2)(a)(iii) and 36(1)(a)(iii) of the Model Law, and 5(1)(c) of the New York Convention. 
128 Born (2009), p. 892. 
129 Idem, p. 975. 
130 See Gaillard (2011). 
 42/50 
Leaving aside France, which developed the concept of the negative effect of Kompetenz-
Kompetenz, countries like England, United States and Portugal have been evermore 
restricting the powers of national courts to decide on jurisdiction when the existence or 
validity of an arbitration agreement is raised by the defendant.  
While positive Kompetenz-Kompetenz only strengthens the jurisdiction of arbitration 
tribunals and is based on sound policy grounds, a strong version of negative effect of 
Kompetenz-Kompetenz entails a disproportionate restriction of national court’s powers. 
Even though article 2(3) of the New York Convention seems to have intended courts to 
perform a full review at stage 1, French and Portuguese courts will only assess whether there 
is any “possibility” or “plausibility” that a valid arbitration agreement has been entered into 
between the parties. In fact, French courts will not perform any review when the arbitration 
tribunal has not yet been constituted. In turn, English courts will give arbitrators priority on 
objections regarding the existence of the arbitration agreement based on speculative criteria, 
such as when they find that it is “virtually certain” that an arbitration agreement exists. Lastly, 
US courts will presume that parties intended arbitrators’ to decide jurisdiction with finality 
(i.e. without any further court review), including existence, validity and scope issues, when 
parties have adopted institutional arbitration rules containing a positive effect provision. 
All these practices set inappropriate thresholds for an arbitration agreement to oust the 
jurisdiction of courts. Consequently, countries will force parties, who have not have agreed to 
arbitrate, to participate in arbitral proceedings. By denying those parties their day in court, 
national jurisdictions are disproportionately limiting parties’ fundamental right to have access 
to court.131 In fact, a party should only be barred from court unless it has been found, under a 
full scrutiny review, that a valid arbitration agreement exists. Otherwise, the legitimacy of the 
arbitral proceedings will be put at risk.  
A full judicial review of the arbitration agreement should also be performed when the 
existence (as opposed to the validity) of the main commercial agreement is being challenged 
by one of the parties. The doctrine of separability will generally only protect an arbitration 
                                                 
131 Born (2009), p. 977. 
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agreement when the validity (as opposed to the existence) of the container agreement is being 
questioned.132 
Those who argue in favour of a strong negative effect, claim that the rule is an important 
instrument to avoid delay of arbitration proceedings due to dilatory challenges.133 However, 
delay will be minor, if arbitral proceedings are allowed to proceed while court action is 
pending. Another argument in favour of negative effect would be that judicial proceedings 
could be centred at the seat of the arbitration. However, jurisdictions are increasingly 
allowing parties to previously waive their rights to set aside proceedings. Thus, increasing 
delocalisation of arbitration might be going into an opposite policy direction, namely of 
abolishing any court control at the seat. Lastly, the argument that the inherent legitimacy risks 
of the negative effect doctrine could be offset by an early challenge of the preliminary award 
cannot be accepted. Arbitrators will only be able to render preliminary awards when the 
analysis related to jurisdiction is not connected with questions of fact and law regarding the 
merits of the dispute. Thus, early judicial relief will not be certain. 
6.1.2 Negative approach to scope issues and to preconditions to arbitration 
As we have suggested above, scope issues could be first decided by arbitrators. Such 
approach would, in our view, not rise legitimacy concerns, since there would be no question 
as to whether a valid arbitration agreement exists. The dispute is limited to the precise reach 
of the terms agreed between the parties, which is a matter closely connected to the arbitrators’ 
function of interpreting the parties’ agreement.134 Furthermore, it is reasonable to expect that 
arbitrators will normally have more expertise in interpreting arbitration clauses. 
The different treatment given to scope issues in the New York Convention and Model Law 
appears to suggest such approach. The review whether an arbitration agreement is “null and 
void, inoperative or incapable of being performed” does not encompass scope questions. 
However, both the Model Law and the New York Convention provide that an award can be 
set aside (Model Law) or refused its enforcement (both Model Law and New York 
                                                 
132 See Mayer (1999), p. 263. 
133 Gaillard & Savage (1999), p. 410. 
134 Born (2009), p. 893. 
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Convention) when the award dealt with a dispute beyond the scope of the arbitration 
agreement.135  
However, a court should have the discretionary power to perform a full judicial determination 
on scope when it would be more appropriate and cost-efficient to do so, such as in the case 
where an arbitration tribunal had not yet been constituted and it appeared highly likely or 
manifest that the dispute did not fall within the arbitration agreement (v.g. arbitration 
agreement with a narrow scope). In those cases it might be beneficial to perform a full judicial 
determination on the matter, instead of wasting the costs and time of having to appoint 
arbitrators and constitute the arbitral tribunal.  
A similar approach to one describe above could also be adopted to decide matters of 
“procedural” jurisdiction”136. Arbitrators could be given priority on procedural preconditions 
for the use of arbitration, such as time limits, waiver, laches or estoppel. In this case, parties 
have validly agreed to arbitrate the dispute at hands. It is only disputed whether the right to 
arbitrate can still be exercised. A court should, however, decide such matters under a full 
scrutiny standard if it would be more appropriate and cost-efficient. 
Courts could also take into account whether an arbitral award would be intended to be 
enforced in the country where the judicial proceeding are taking place. A judgment in the 
country of recognition and enforcement can be more important for the enforceability of the 
arbitral award than any control at the seat, which has no mandatory extraterritorial effect 
under article 5(1)(e) of the New York Convention.  
6.2 Party autonomy 
Countries should not accomplish stronger efficacy and efficiency of arbitral proceedings by 
neglecting the parties’ fundamental right of access to justice. In turn, they should grant parties 
greater autonomy to pursue that purpose by their own. 
In fact, there are still many countries which perceive that greater party autonomy would 
infringe their domestic public order. For example, Germany has disallowed Kompetenz-
                                                 
135 Articles 34(2)(a)(iii) and 36(1)(a)(iii) Model Law, and 5(1)(c) New York Convention. 
136 The kind of procedural arbitrability mentioned in Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 37 U.S. 79, 2002. 
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Kompetenz clauses because it considered not to be within the disposition of the parties to 
limit the judicial review of arbitrator’s jurisdiction.137 On this matter, we argued that countries 
should adopt international concepts of public order, which are more appropriate to address the 
international nature of arbitration. Arbitration should not suffer under each country’s national 
idiosyncrasies. An international view of public would allow for greater party autonomy. In 
fact, countries such as France, Belgium, Sweden and Switzerland already allow parties to 
waive in advance to any set aside proceedings.138 Such waiver would avoid duplication of 
judicial proceedings and would argue against the purpose of the negative effect doctrine to 
centre all litigation at the country of the seat. In fact, waiver of set aside proceedings would 
call for strong judicial determination of jurisdiction by courts at stage 1, possibly even on 
matters such as scope and procedural jurisdiction. If parties waive their right to set aside, a 
party would, in the absence of full judicial determination at stage 1, only have the possibility 
to challenge the jurisdiction of arbitrators by refusing enforcement of the award (unless 
arbitrators would have themselves denied jurisdiction). 
In turn, a way to improve the efficiency of court proceedings at stage 1 would be to allow 
parties to waive their right to judicial appeal. As Dalhuisen correctly stated, “one of the 
primary aims of arbitration is to do away (a) with procedural formalism and (b) the facility of 
appeal. Professional parties, who are usually the litigants in arbitration, do not need them or 
want them and do not see in them a guarantee for better dispute resolution or greater 
justice.”139 For example, the Portuguese Code of Civil Procedure expressly allows parties to 
waive in advance their right to judicial appeal.140 By waiving their rights to appeal, parties 
would obtain a judgment with res judicata effect regarding jurisdiction in less time. An 
express provision contained in the arbitration agreement to waive judicial appeal would not 
have the same logical problem as the jurisdiction agreements envisaged by First Options, at 
least when a valid arbitration agreement was entered into between the parties. Thus, if a court 
finds that a valid arbitration agreement exists, such judgment will be immediately delivered 
                                                 
137 Ahrend (1996), p. 25. 
138 Poudret & Besson (2007), p. 385. 
139 Dalhuisen (2016), p. 398. 
140 Article 632(1). 
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with res judicata effect. Such waiver would, therefore, be especially effective in avoiding 
dilatory and illegitimate claims regarding jurisdiction. 
As we mentioned in our introduction, the international arbitration community should 
continuously strive towards a stronger transnationalisation of its arbitration regime and 
establish international standards of control, such as regarding public order. In that case, 
parties would be able to improve the efficacy of arbitration proceedings by recourse to private 
autonomy. I suspect that course of action would be the beginning of the end of the 
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